“The modern man is he who has been re-ligionized precisely to the extent that he has been de-Christianized. The modern man is he who, even as he stripped Christianity of the ideological (metaphysical) pretension that its belief system was superior to all others, has delivered himself body and soul to the idea that all belief systems are equally legitimate in matters of veracity.

“Thus, the contemporary closure of metaphysics seems to us to amount to a ‘sceptico-fideist’ closure of metaphysics, dominated by what one could call the thought of the ‘wholly-other’. Wittgenstein and Heidegger are the emblematic representatives of this thought and, far from inaugurating a radical break with the past in this matter, both remain heirs to the legacy of a venerable and well documented fideist tradition (inaugurated by Montaigne and developed notably by Gassendi and Bayle), whose anti-metaphysical character has always been intended to protect piety from the incursions of rationality, and which reaches its culminating point in these two thinkers. The ‘mystical’ evoked in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, or the theology that Heidegger admitted he had long considered writing – on condition that it contained nothing philosophical, not even the word ‘being’ – are expressions of an aspiration towards an absoluteness which would no longer retain anything metaphysical, and which one is generally careful to designate by another name. This is a piety that has been evacuated of content, and that is now celebrated for its own sake by a thinking that has given up trying to substantiate it. For the apex of fideism occurs at the point where it becomes the thought of piety’s superiority to thinking, without any specific content being privileged, since it is a matter of establishing through thinking that it is the prerogative of piety, and of piety alone, to posit its own contents. Accordingly, the contemporary devolution towards the wholly-other (the otherwise empty object of the profession of faith) is the strict and inevitable obverse of interpreting the obsolescence of the principle of sufficient reason as reason’s discovery of its own essential inability to uncover an absolute¬† – thus, fideism is merely the other name for strong correlationism.”

~ After Finitude, 48 (italics mine)

Based upon Meillassoux’s argument, it would seem that Milbank (and Benedict XVI) are right to question fideism in all it’s guises, including the currents found in Barth.